	ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Re: The Role of the	e Committe	ee on Ex	changes	(COMEX)
FROM:	_		EXTENSION	NO.
]			DATE 1 February 1982
Executive Secretary		L		1 Tebruary 1302
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	D	DATE		COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	INITIALS	STA
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Room 7D60 Hqs.	> 01			
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

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TTIC-C-07 1 February 1982

NOTE FOR: Executive Assistant, DDCI	
FROM: Executive Secretary Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC)	
1. asked that I alert you to the role of the Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) in some of the activities recently caricatured in the press regarding Government "restrictions" on foreign students in the US universities. You may wish to brief the DDCI, since the matter may sometime be raised with him either by academics or by the press	

As you perhaps know, COMEX--now a subcommittee of TTIC-provides information, analysis, and related recommendations to State, Commerce, and other interested agencies regarding the technology transfer and intelligence implications of proposed visits to the US by nationals from the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China. When US Government money is involved in an exchange program, the likelihood of significant, unwanted, technology transfer can result in the program being extensively modified or even cancelled. In the much more numerous cases where the visits are "privately" funded and in all China cases, the visitors almost always receive visas and come to the United States. The COMEX task is to alert US hosts to the potential problems and to suggest restrictions in itineraries or programs intended to keep the visitors away from the most sensitive technologies. COMEX solicits contributions from experts in the intelligence, trade control, and defense communities; the Community responses provided to State are first reviewed in draft by an interagency working group. When the US hosts for foreign visitors provide new information or suggest other considerations, COMEX reopens the "case" and reviews (and sometimes modifies) its recommendations. COMEX imposes no restrictions; State and other policy agencies do, usually using COMEX advice.

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Executive Assistant, DDCI				
3. Especially since the "five universities" letter some months ago on controls on VHSIC research, there has been unusual sensitivity in some universities regarding the national security controls on academic research. The foreign student issue is somewhat secondary, but it has flared up from time-to-time in scientific journals (a la the Carlucci-Science exchange of letters) and in the popular press. The recent case (Tab A) and the December case (Tab B) were two examples of the latter. Copies of our COMEX opinions and of the press articles are at Tabs.	252			
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except that persons in the universities and in the press decided to use them to "raise the issues." Incidentally, the case is still evolving.				
US hosts at the universities are willing to accept for a shortened visit within the framework of the COMEX restrictions (even the professor at Stanford!). The University Administration at Stanford may yet forbid adherence to "any" restrictions as a "matter of principle." On the other hand, now that the visit has become a matter of public attention, the policy people at Defense and others are considering whether letting it happen at all would convey the wrong message to the Soviets and to our NATO allies. Incidentally, the newspaper articles are incorrect or misleading in several instances: for example, the National Academy of Sciences has not refused to forward Government restrictions.				
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Attachments: A/S				

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